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Finding a Compromise: The Struggle Between Federal
Regulation And State Sovereignty - Analyzing The
Effects Of Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan
Public Service Commission

By Sindy Lie*

The wisdom of those who drafted our constitution and
conceived our nation as functioning with three strong
and independent branches have proven truly
remarkable. It is the responsibility of every generation
to be true to the founders' vision of the proper role of
the courts in our society. If confirmed, I recognize that
I will have a tremendous responsibility to keep our
judicial system strong, and to help ensure that the
courts meet their obligations to strictly apply the laws
and the Constitution.1
I. INTRODUCTION

The unique nature of the trucking industry in this country often
requires drivers to travel across states to deliver goods. The logistical
problems with coordinating such long haul travels are often
complicated. To make matters worse, trucking companies have to
deal with a vast number of regulations before they are allowed to
conduct interstate travel. So, doesn't it make sense for Congress to

* J.D. candidate, 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.S., 2004,
University of Southern California. The author would like to thank her family and
friends for their unconditional love and support. Special thanks to her parents and
sisters whose belief in her has never faltered.
1. Harriet Miers, at http://www.quoteland.com (last visited on Jan. 30, 2006).
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simplify the amount of regulations imposed on trucking companies?
And, should the States be allowed to impose more requirements on
trucking companies in addition to the federal regulations? Mid-Con
Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission deals
with these problems.2 This case note will explore the Supreme
Court's ruling in this case. Part II will outline the historical
background of the law at hand. Part III will lay out the essential facts
of the case. Part IV will analyze and critique the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part V will discuss the legal, administrative, and
societal impact of the holding. Finally, Part VI will conclude the
case note.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Supremacy Clause
The United States Constitution provides that "[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.",3 This provision, known as the Supremacy Clause, has been a
heavily litigated topic across the United States. This historical
background will illustrate the evolution of the Supremacy Clause as
applied by the Supreme Court.
In the landmark case, Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court
held, "[i]n every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it."'4 In Gibbons, the Court
found that a federal license issued under the Federal Coastal Act was
supreme over a monopoly given by the State of New York because
the state monopoly was inconsistent with the Federal Coastal Act.5

2. Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427
(2005).
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
5. Id. at 240. The Court held that Gibbons' licenses "were granted under an
act of Congress, passed in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, gave
full authority to ...navigate the waters of the United States ...any law of the State
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Therefore, the Court determined that inconsistent state laws are
inferior to federal laws. 6 This ruling lays out the foundation of the
preemption doctrine.
In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, the Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether the federal Locomotive
Boiler Inspection Act precluded the state of Georgia from regulating
locomotive equipment for safety purposes.7 The Court looked for a
clear and manifested intent of Congress to preclude states from
exercising their power. 8 To this end, the Court looked to see if
Congress intended to "occupy the entire field of regulating
locomotive equipment" through the federal law. 9 The Court held that
it did, because the Act set the standard for locomotives, and thus had
the power to require installation of certain equipment.1 ° This
approach to preemption is often referred to as "field preemption",
because a state law is deemed preempted by federal law if Congress
intended to occupy the field at issue through the federal law.1
Modem Supreme Court decisions have used a more practical
approach to preemption cases. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
the Court started with the assumption that federal law would not be
of New-York to the contrary ...
is repugnant to the said constitution, and void." Id.
at 239-40.
6. Id. at 210.
[T]he States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which
depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of
Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will
enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New-York ...have,
in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of
Congress ...Should this collision exist ...
the acts of New-York
must yield to the law of Congress.
Id. at 210.
7. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 607 (1926). The Georgia
statute provided for, among other things, a requirement for an automatic fire door
and cab curtains. Id. at 609-10.
8. Id. at 611.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Court found that Congress, through the Boiler Inspection Act,
intended to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to set the
rules and regulations for locomotives. Id. This conferred power "extends to the
design, the construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and
tender and of all appurtenances." Id.
11. Id.
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preempted unless there was a clear and manifest purpose of Congress
to preclude state regulation. 12 There are four different ways to show
Congress' intent to preclude state regulation.' 3 First, the scheme of
the federal law is so pervasive that Congress clearly intended to leave
no room for the states to regulate further. 14 Second, the federal
interest addressed is so dominant that states are assumed to have no
authority to regulate the field. 5 Third, "the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed
by [state law] may reveal the same purpose."' 16 Finally, the state

12. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). This case involved
warehouse owners operating under a license issued pursuant to the United States
Warehouse Act. Id. at 220. The Illinois Commerce Commission alleged that the
warehouse owners were charging excessive rates in violation of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act. Id. The Court looked to the purpose of the Act and found that
Congress intended to "achieve 'fair and uniform business practices."' Id. at 236
(quoting Fed. Compress Co. v. MacLean, 291 U.S. 17, 23 (1934)). Since the state
of Illinois was trying to regulate in a way that was already regulated by the federal
act, the state law must yield. Id.
13. Id. at 230.
14. Id. Petitioners in the Rice case argued that the federal scheme was limited
and the States were free to regulate in those areas that are not covered by federal
law. Id. at 229. The Court made the determination that the warehouses were used
to store goods traveling in interstate commerce. Id. Therefore, the area of
regulating these warehouses was in the federal domain. Id. The Court went on to
analyze the language of the federal scheme and found that the Act included strong
language to suggest that Congress intended for the federal law to stand independent
of any state law. Id. at 233-34. In another preemption case, Pennsylvania Railroad
v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania,the Court was asked to determine if
a state law regarding railroad cars was preempted by the Safety Appliance Act. Pa.
R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Pa., 250 U.S. 566, 567 (1919). In that case, the
Court said that the Safety Appliance Act imposed such elaborate regulations that
the state act must be preempted. Id. at 569. Specifically, the Court ruled that "the
paramount authority has gone so far that the statute of Pennsylvania cannot impose
the additional obligation in issue here." Id.
15. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The Court illustrated this requirement clearly in
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Hines involved the validity of the Alien
Registration Act. Id. at 60. The Court found that the area of foreign affairs, which
includes immigration, is clearly within national powers. Id. at 62. Foreign relations
is a field that should be exclusively in the hands of the federal government and,
thus, the states should not be able to impose additional or conflicting regulations.
Id. at63.
16. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The Supreme Court cited other cases in the Rice
opinion to further explain this third method. Id. at 230. In New York Central
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regulation imposes obligations that would produce an inconsistent
result with the objectives of the federal law.17
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., a Washington state statute
regulating tankers in Puget Sound was challenged under the
Supremacy Clause as being preempted by the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972.18 The Court found that, even if Congress has not
precluded states from regulating a particular field, a state statute is
preempted if the statute conflicts with a valid federal law.' 9 A
conflict may be shown in one of two ways. 20 First, complying with
both the state statute and the federal law is physically impossible.2 '

Railroad v. Winfield, the Court was faced with a claim for worker's compensation
under New York's Workmen's Compensation Law. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield,
244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917). The claim was for a personal injury suffered by an
employee of a railroad company. Id. at 152. The railroad company challenged the
claim on the grounds that the Employer's Liability Act of Congress governed the
claim exclusively and no claim could be made under the state law. Id. at 148. The
Court found that Congress had exercised its power to regulate a carrier's liability
for injuries sustained by employees; New York had no power to interfere. Id. at
152. Congress' legislation in that field manifests intent to preclude any other
regulations. Id. Therefore, the purpose of the federal law and the requirements of
the state law are the same, and the state law is precluded. Id.
17. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. One example of how this method may be used to
establish Congress' intent to preempt may be found in Hill v. Florida. Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). That case involved two laws, sections four and six
of the Florida Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 539. The Court
found that the Florida statute was precluded by the federal law because following
the requirements of the Florida statute would produce inconsistent results with the
purpose of the federal law. Id. at 542. Specifically, "if the Florida law is valid he
could be found guilty of a contempt for doing that which the act of Congress
permits him to do." Id. For that reason, the Court found that the Florida statute
was preempted by the Federal Act.
18. Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 154 (1978).
19. Id. at 154.
20. Id.
21. Id. The Court cited to another case to further explain this first method. Id.
at 158. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, the Court stated the
following as an example of how this method can be used to show federal
preemption of a state law:
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and
requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility
for one engaged in interstate commerce. That would be the
situation here if, for example, the federal orders forbade the
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Or, second, the state statute "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. ' 22 In Mid-Con Freight Systems, the Court analyzed the
issue under this second type of conflict to determine if the Michigan
law was preempted by the Federal Act.23
B. The IntermodalSurface TransportationEfficiency Act
In 2002, the Court dealt with the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) for the first time. In that
case, Yellow Transportation,Inc. v. Michigan, the issue was whether
a state was allowed to collect registration fees in excess of those
allowed by the ISTEA.24 In the opinion, the Court provided some
picking and marketing of any avocado testing more than 7% oil,
while the California test excluded from the State any avocado
measuring less than 8% oil content.
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
22. Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). The Court applied this second type of conflict in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., a case that dealt with the issue of whether the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted a state tort law action. Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). The Court found that the state tort law
stood in the way of accomplishing the objectives of the Federal Act. Id. at 881.
The state tort law imposed a duty for automobile manufacturers to install airbags
instead of other passive restraint systems. Id. The federal law was passed to give
manufacturers the option of choosing between various passive restraint systems.
Id. Therefore, the state action conflicted with the objective of the federal law and
was preempted. Id.
23. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2434.
24. Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 38-39 (2002). The
petitioner in this case, an interstate trucking company, challenged the fees levied by
Michigan on petitioner's trucks after the Single State Registration System
("SSRS") came into effect under the ISTEA's fee cap provision. Id. at 42-43. The
fee cap provision deemed any fee collected or charged in excess of those provided
for by the ICC's fee system would be an unreasonable burden. Id. at 40.
Michigan, prior to the implementation of the SSRS, entered into reciprocal
agreements with other states, in which Michigan agreed to waive the annual
registration fee for vehicles registered in another state that did not charge a fee for
Michigan carriers. Id. at 42. For the years 1990 and 1991, Michigan did not levy
any fees on petitioner, a Kansas based company, but did send petitioner a bill for
the 1992 registration year. Id.. The Court used the rule that, if the test of the statute
does not unambiguously resolve the issue, then the agency's interpretation of the
statute must be sustained. Id. at 45. The Court found that the ISTEA was silent as
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insight into Congress' intent in passing the ISTEA. Specifically, the
Court found that the ISTEA was passed to replace the older "bingo
card" regime, which was administratively burdensome and
inefficient.25 Congress intended to delegate power to the ICC to
impose regulations for the Single State Registration System and to
resolve any ambiguities in the federal statute. 26 The Court referred
back to this case for guidance in deciding Mid-Con Freight
Systems.27
III. FACTS
A. EssentialFacts of the Case
Mid-Con Freight Systems is a consolidation of class actions, in
which the plaintiffs are individual trucking companies. 28 The lawsuit

began when plaintiff, Westlake Transportation Inc., filed a complaint
alleging that various provisions of the Michigan Motor Carrier Act
were unconstitutional because they were preempted by federal
laws. 29 Another plaintiff, Troy Cab, Inc., joined the lawsuit on

to reciprocity agreements but the ICC's interpretation of the ISTEA's fee cap
provision was a reasonable interpretation. Id. at 45-46. The ICC's interpretation of
the fee cap provision is as follows: "where a State waives its registration fee, its
'fee ... collected or charged' is zero and must remain zero." Id. at 38. This rule is
consistent with the ISTEA's language and resolves any ambiguity. Id. at 48. Thus,
the ICC's rule should be given deference. Id. at 46.
25. Id. at 39. Before 1994, interstate trucking companies were charged annual
registration fees by the States of $10 per vehicle or less. Id. As proof, the carrier
vehicles would receive a stamp on a "uniform identification cab card" carried on
each vehicle. Id. This was known as the "bingo card" system. Id.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2433.
28. Id. See also Westlake Transp. v. PSC, 662 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Mich. App.
Ct. 2003). This decision affirmed the decision of the Michigan Court of Claims
that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id.
29. Westlake Transp., 662 N.W.2d at 789. Westlake Transportation, Inc., et
al., filed their complaint on January 3, 1995. Id. They alleged that the $100 fee
imposed by Michigan on interstate and intrastate motor carriers was
unconstitutional. They contended that federal laws, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11506 and 11501
preempted them. Id. This complaint began the litigation that led to the case being
discussed in this case note, Mid-Con Freight System, Inc. v. Michigan Public
Service Commission.
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January 9, 1995.30 In February 1995, intervening plaintiffs, two
trucking companies, filed a complaint alleging that Michigan's
intrastate decal fee violated the Commerce Clause. 31 In April 1995,
the plaintiffs' cases were consolidated and the class action was
certified.32
The Michigan law in question involves a requirement that carriers
in the state of Michigan pay a $100 fee for each vehicle registered in
Michigan and operating entirely in interstate commerce. 33 The
plaintiffs are interstate trucking companies whose trucks have
34
Michigan license plates and operate entirely in interstate commerce.
35
Therefore, they fall under the scope of the state law in question.
30. Id. Other trucking companies are also named as parties in this case. Id
Troy Cab, Inc., et al., filed their complaint on January 9, 1995. Id. The complaint
contained similar allegations.
31. Id. The intervening plaintiffs alleged that the intrastate decal fee violated
the Commerce Clause. Id Plaintiffs Westlake Transportation, et al., and the
intervening plaintiffs proceeded to amend their respective complaints to adopt the
others' substantive arguments. The cases were subsequently consolidated in April
1995 and the class actions were certified in June 1995. Id.
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 478.2(2) (West 2002) states: "A motor carrier
licensed in this state shall pay an annual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated
by the motor carrier which is registered in this state and operating entirely in
interstate commerce."
34. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431.
35. Id. Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the
power to regulate commerce among the several states. See CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Therefore, trucks operating entirely in interstate should be regulated by Congress
because they are considered an instrumentality of interstate commerce. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-90 (1824) (defining commerce as "the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches").
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce is complete and plenary; thus
states are virtually precluded from regulating interstate commerce. See Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 209-10 (holding that Congress' power to regulate' implies in its nature, full
power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all
others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is
designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as
well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much
disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave
untouched, as that on which it has operated). States may, however, pass regulations
for the purpose of regulating local activity as part of their own sovereignty as long
as it is not in conflict with any act of Congress. Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, stated the following:
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Related Michigan laws require that the carrier identify each truck's
make, type, year, serial number, and unit number. 36 The truck will
then receive a decal that must be affixed to the truck.3 7 Carriers that
pay this fee are exempt from the $10 fee imposed by the Single State
Registration System if the carrier chooses Michigan as the base
state.38
The plaintiffs contend that the Michigan law is preempted by
39
federal laws that regulate the same aspect of interstate trucking.
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 14504 imposes a registration requirement
for motor carriers. 40 This is known as the Single State Registration
System (SSRS) statute. 41 The SSRS sets forth a system that allows
carriers to fill out a single set of forms for one state (the base State),
which registers the vehicle's Federal Permit in all states that

[I]n exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal
affairs, whether of trading or police, the States may sometimes
enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering
with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in
pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter upon the
inquiry, whether the laws of [that state], as expounded by the
highest tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this
case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a
citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this
collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were
passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States,' or, in virtue
of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police. In one
case and the other, the acts of [that state] must yield to the law of
Congress.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209-10.
36. See Mid-Con FreightSys.,, 125 S. Ct. at 2431.
37. See id.; Respondents' Brief at 3, Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005) (No. 03-1234).
38. See Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431. 49 U.S.C. § 14504 requires
motor carriers to register with only one state. This state becomes the base state.
See 49 U.S.C. § 14504 (2005).
39. Petitioners' Brief at 2, Mid-Con Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005)(No. 03-1234).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(1)(A) provides: "a motor carrier is required to
register annually with only one state by providing evidence of its Federal
registration."
41. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c).
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participate in the SSRS.42 The statute provides that states are not
allowed to impose any additional registration requirement.43 Any
further obligation that a state imposes constitutes an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. 4 The state also may not require any
decals or similar means of registration.45
B. Case History
Petitioners first sought review of the Michigan law from the
Michigan Court of Claims.46 That court rejected their claim to
invalidate Michigan's $100 fee. 47 The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed that decision.48 Petitioners proceeded to seek leave to appeal
to the Michigan Supreme Court. 49 That leave was denied.5 ° The
United States Supreme Court then granted the petition for certiorari
and consolidated the case with American Trucking Associations, Inc.
v. Michigan Public Service Commission, a case involving interstate
51
trucking companies seeking review of a separate Michigan fee.

42. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(1)(A)-(C).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b): "When a State registration requirement imposes
obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an
unreasonable burden."
44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 14504(B)(iii).
46. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv.Comm'n, 622 N.W.2d 784
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
47. Id. Petitioners sought to invalidate the Michigan law by contending that
the federal SSRS statute preempted it.
48. Id. at 804 (holding that the Michigan law is not preempted by the federal
statute because the $100 fee imposed by Michigan is considered a "regulatory fee"
and is not within the scope of the term "registration fee" as provided for in the
SSRS statute).
49. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also Am. Trucking Ass'ns v Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S.
429 (2005).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Justice Breyer 's Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer delivered the Court's opinion. 52 He began by
establishing the main legal issue at hand, preemption.5 3 The conflict
arises between a Michigan law that imposes a fee on Michigan
licensed trucks operating in interstate commerce, and a federal statute
that provides that state registration requirements for motor carriers in
excess of the standards outlined in the statute are an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.5 4 The Court's opinion starts the
analysis by asking the question: does the federal statute preempt the
Michigan law such that the Michigan fee requirement is
unconstitutional and invalid? 55 To answer this question, the Court
must look to whether the Michigan fee is the kind of state registration
requirement to which the federal statute refers.5 6 If the Michigan fee
is considered a state registration requirement within the meaning of
the federal SSRS statute, then the Michigan fee is an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce and cannot be upheld, because it is
57
preempted by the federal SSRS statute.
Justice Breyer proceeded to outline the background of federal
laws regarding interstate motor carriers. 58 Motor carriers have long
been required to obtain a Federal Permit in order to operate in

52. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2429.

53. Id.
54. Id. The Michigan law at issue in this case is a provision of the Michigan
Motor Carrier Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 478.2(2) (West 2002). The federal
statute governing registration of motor carriers by a state is 49 U.S.C. § 14504
(2005).

55. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430. The Constitution states that
federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and therefore, preempt inconsistent
state laws. See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text. If the Michigan law is

inconsistent with the federal statute, then the federal law controls, and the Michigan
law must yield. Id. The case analysis will focus primarily on this issue.
56. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430.

57. Id.
58. Id. Specifically, Justice Breyer is concerned with federal laws regarding

requirements that interstate motor carriers obtain a permit to operate business in
interstate commerce. Id.
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interstate commerce. 59 Consequently, most states required proof that
truckers had a Federal Permit by requiring the trucks to register with
the state.6° Under the old system, truckers would pay up to $10 per
truck for the state registration fee. 6 1 In turn, they would receive a
stamp that is affixed to a multi-state "bingo card".62 That bingo card
63
would be carried inside the vehicle.
Congress soon realized the inefficiency of this bingo card system
and established a new "Single State Registration System" or the
SSRS.64 Under this new system, motor carriers would only need to
register with one state (the base state), which registers the Federal
Permit in all participating states.65 The SSRS statute provides that
the states can require truckers to produce proof that the trucking
company possesses a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, the name of
a designated agent to receive service of process, and a total fee that is
equal to the sum of individual state fees. 66 The trucks would then
receive a receipt that would be carried with the vehicle. 67

59. Id.
60. Id. See 49 U.S.C. §302(b) (2) (1976). A Federal Permit is proof that motor
carriers have complied with certain federal requirements, and thus, are allowed to
operate in interstate commerce. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430. States
usually required truckers to file evidence of proof of having a Federal Permit with a
state agency. Id.
61. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430.
62. Id. The stamp serves as proof that the trucks have registered their Federal
Permit with that state. Id.
63. Id. See also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1023.32, 1023.33 (1990). The bingo card
contained stamps from all the different states that a truck has filed evidence with,
and through which the trucks will travel. Id.
64. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430. The SSRS is a part of the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991 (ISTEA). 49 U.S.C. § 14504
(2005). The Act still remains in effect today.
65. Id. The trucking company would only be required to fill out one set of
forms and pay only one total fee instead of filling out separate forms and paying
separate fees for each state with which it is registering its Federal Permit. Id.
Under this system, filling out one form and paying one fee registers the Federal
Permit with every state that is participating with the SSRS and through which the
trucks will travel. Id.
66. Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(2)(A). This section lays out the specific
requirements that a state can demand when an interstate motor carrier registers its
Federal Permit with that state. The requirements include filing and maintaining
proof of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, payment of a fee in accordance with
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The SSRS statute contains a provision that was at issue in this
case. 68 The statute provides that a state may not impose further
obligations in excess of the standards provided. 69 The part in excess
constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.7 ° The
statute also states that the state may not require any stamps, decals, or
similar registration means. 7 1 Also, any fee charged or collected
outside of the SSRS system is deemed an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce.72 However, if the state establishes a system that
is in compliance with the SSRS, the state would be free from any
Commerce Clause attack.73

the fee system established in subsection (B)(iv), and the filing of a name of an
agent for service of process. The fee system for the SSRS scheme is provided for
in § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III) which states the following:
[The] fee system for the filing of proof of insurance... (I) based
on the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier operates
in a State and on the number of States in which the carrier
operates; (II) minimizes the costs of complying with the
registration system; and (III) results in a fee for each participating
state that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that
such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.
Id.
The statute goes on to state that fees may not be collected for the purpose of
filling and maintaining evidence of a Federal Permit. See § 14504(c)(2)(B)(v).
Also, the charging or collection of fees that is not in accordance to the fee system
stated above is prohibited and will be considered a burden on interstate commerce.
See § 14054(c)(2)(C).
67. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430. See also § 14504(c)(2)(B)(i):
"The standards of the Secretary shall require that the registration state issue a
receipt ... reflecting that the carrier has filed proof of insurance ... and has paid fee
amounts in accordance with the fee system ... "
68. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504.
69.49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
70. Id.
71. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iii).
72. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(2)(C).
73. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431. The SSRS statute contains a
provision that protects states who comply with the SSRS from a Commerce Clause
attack. The provision states that state registration requirements that are in
compliance with the standards of the Secretary are not an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce. See 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
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Justice Breyer then looked at the Michigan law in question.7 4
The Michigan Motor Carrier Act requires motor carriers licensed in
the State of Michigan and operating entirely in interstate commerce
to pay an annual fee of $100.75 Upon payment of this fee, trucks
would receive a decal that is affixed to the truck.7 6 The carrier is
then exempt from the $10 fee imposed by the SSRS if the carrier
designates Michigan as the base state for the carrier.7 7 The issue in
this case was whether the Michigan fee is considered an obligation in
excess of the SSRS and thus, an unreasonable burden on interstate
8
commerce.

7

1. The First Legal Question
The Court began its analysis by examining the actual wording of
the statute.79 In particular, Justice Breyer focused on the meaning and
scope of the words, "State registration requirement. 8 ° If the Court
chooses to interpret the words narrowly, as the respondent argues,
then the limitations apply only to requirements that relate to

74. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 478.2(2) (West 2002).
75. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 478.2(2) (West 2002). Other Michigan laws
related to this legislation require the carrier to identify the interstate truck's make,
type, year, and serial number. See Equipment List Form P-344-T, App. to
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition, Westlake
Transp., Inc., v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (No.
95-15628-CM).
76. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2431.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2432. The Court in Rice, laid out a four prong test to see if there is
clear and manifest Congressional intent to preclude state legislation. See supra
notes 10-15 and accompanying text. The third prong asks the question, does the
law on its face evidence any federal intent to preempt? Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
Therefore, part of the modem day preemption analysis relies on looking at the
federal law's text and language to look for Congressional intent to preclude state
legislation. Id. This is the analysis that Justice Breyer chooses to start with for this
case. Id.
80. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2432. The phrase "State registration
requirement" appears in the second sentence of § 14504(b): "When a State
registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards of the
Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable burden" (emphasis added).
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registration of interstate motor carriers based on their operation in
interstate commerce. 81 The petitioners, however, argue that the
words should be interpreted more broadly. 82 They contend that the
limitations encompass any requirement imposed upon interstate
motor carriers that constitutes some form of registration. 83 To
resolve the conflict, Justice Breyer must determine the correct
interpretation of the federal statute at issue in this case.
Justice Breyer tried to determine whether or not Congress
intended to preempt local legislation by looking at the text, the
historical context, and purpose of the statute itself.84 This analysis is
consistent with the third prong of the preemption test given by this
Court in Rice.85 That aspect of the test provides that the Court should
look at the law itself to determine whether or not Congress had a
clear and manifest intent to preempt state legislation. 86 The Court
determined that the words, "State registration requirement" applies
only to state requirements regarding evidence of a Federal Permit,
87
proof of insurance, or name of an agent for service of process.
According to Justice Breyer, the scope of "State registration
requirement" is extremely narrow and only encompasses the
requirements laid out in this statute regarding those three subjects.88
The Court first examines the statutory language of the first
sentence of § 14504(b). 89 The first sentence reads as follows:
81. Id. See also Petitioners' Brief at 15, Mid-Con Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub.
Comm'r, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005) (No. 03-1234).
82. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432.
83. See Respondents' Brief at 6, Mid-Con Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub. Comm'r,
125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005) (No. 03-1234).
84. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432.
85. Id. See also Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
86. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432.
87. Id. "The words 'State registration' in the preemption provision's first
sentence refer only to state systems that seek evidence that a trucker has complied
with specific, federally enumerated, SSRS obligations." Id.
88. Id. The Court came to this conclusion after establishing that the first
sentence references the "standards of the Secretary," which are the specific
requirements laid out in subsection (c). Id. Likewise, the whole statute is focused
on those requirements. Id. The specific requirements are set forth in § 14504(c),
including proof of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and name of an agent for
service of process. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c).
89. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
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The requirement of a State that a motor carrier,
providing transportation subject to jurisdiction under
subchapter I of chapter 135 and providing
transportation in that State, must register with the State
is not an unreasonable burden on transportation
referred to in section 13501 when the State registration
is completed under standards of the Secretary under
subsection (c). 90
The words "standards of the Secretary" refer to the standards set
forth in section (c) of the same statute, which provides the specific
requirements of evidence of Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and
the name of an agent for service of process. 9' Therefore, according
to Justice Breyer, the statute's references to "State registration
requirement" includes only those
requirements relating to the specific
92
items laid out in subsection (c).

Similarly, in the second sentence, Justice Breyer interprets the
words narrowly. 93

The second sentence reads, "[w]hen a State

registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the
standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable
burden." 94 Following the same analysis of the first sentence, the

90.49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
91. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c)(2). The statute provides that states may require a
motor carrier to produce four things: evidence of Federal registration, proof of
required insurance, payment to the State of fees in accordance with the fee system
established later in the statute, and the filing of a name for a local agent for service
of process. Id
92. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2432. According to Justice Breyer,
the focus of the whole statute is with the specific SSRS requirements laid out in
subsection (c). Id. Therefore, the text as a whole clearly indicates that the words
"state registration" does not cover all registration requirements, only some. Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Moreover, in section (a) of the SSRS statute, the term
"1standards" is defined as the "specification of forms and procedures required by the
regulations of the Secretary to prove the lawfulness of transportation by motor
carrier." See § 14504(a).
93. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2433. In Justice Breyer's words:
"How could the same words in the second sentence refer to something totally
different [than the words in the first sentence]?" Id. He fails to find any indication
that the phrase "State registration requirement" in the second sentence, refers to all
state registration requirements, instead of only those registration requirements
related to the SSRS obligations. Id.
94. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b) (emphasis added).
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Court sees the words "State registration requirement" as referring
only to the requirements provided by subsection (c). 95 Justice Breyer
rejects the contention that the words include "all State Registration
requirements 'imposed on interstate carriers by reason of their
operation in interstate commerce."' 96 To read the words in any way
different than the way it was interpreted in the first sentence would
make the statute more complex than it should be. 97 Moreover, the
Court was not able to find any other language elsewhere in the statute
that would suggest the words refer to anything but the requirements
set forth in subsection (c). 98
The Court proceeded to look at the historical context of §
14504. 99 The federal SSRS statute was put in place for the purpose of
replacing the older, more burdensome "bingo card" system.' 00 Under

95. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432. See also supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
96. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2433. This contention was put forth by
the United States in an Amicus Curiae Brief. See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-20, Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005).
97. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2432. If the Court chose to read the
phrase, "State registration requirement" in the second sentence differently than it
read the words in the first sentence, the statute would become more complex than it
should be. Id. As Justice Breyer puts it, "the dissent must resort to interpretive
acrobatics" in order to avoid onerous results. Id. at 2433.
98. Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504. Justice Breyer emphasizes that he sees
"no language elsewhere in the statue suggesting that the term 'State registration
requirement' refers to any kind of State Registration whatsoever that might affect
interstate carriers." Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2433. Thus, the words in
the second sentence must also be referring to state registration requirements that
relate to the SSRS. Id.
99. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2433. Looking at the historical context
of the statue is part of the third prong of the preemption test laid out in Rice. Rice,
331 U.S. at 230.
100. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2433. See also Yellow Transp., Inc. v.
Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 39-40 (2002). Under the old system, as discussed
previously in this case note, truckers were required to register with each individual
state that the truck wishes to travel through. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at
2430. This system required separate forms, separate fees, and separate stamps as
proof of registration. Id. To remedy the inefficiency of the "bingo card" system,
Congress put in place the SSRS scheme. Id. The new system was designed to ease
the burden of registering with each state individually by allowing motor carriers to
register its Federal Permit with one state, filling out one set of forms and paying
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the old system, federal law did not govern the collection of any fees
or taxes imposed by the State for any other purpose not within the
"bingo card" system.' 0 ' There were no limits to any state fees other
0 2
than those relating to Federal Permit and insurance requirements.'
Justice Breyer found no indication that Congress, when creating the
new scheme, intended to broaden the preemptive scope of the older
system.10 3 The only difference between the old and new system is
the efficiency afforded to interstate motor carriers of having to only
register with one state instead of many.' 0 4 The new statute only
05
sought to expedite the process, not create more regulation. 1
Justice Breyer finally turned to the statute's basic purpose or
objective. 0 6 The statute was enacted for the primary purpose of
"improving the efficiency of the 'bingo card' system and simplifying
a uniform scheme for providing States with certain vital information
one fee. Id. The trucks would then be registered with each participating SSRS

state. Id.
101. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2433.
Indeed, federal regulations specified that the federal 'bingocard' statute did not 'affect' the 'collection or [the] method of
collection of taxes or fees by a State' from interstate truckers
for the operation of vehicles within' its 'borders.' ... And they
further provided that the statute did not 'affect' state
requirements 'as to the external identification of vehicles to
indicate the payment of a State tax or fee imposed for revenue
purposes or for any other purpose' not governed by the 'bingo
card' system.
Id. at 2433-34; 49 U.S.C. §§ 1023.104, 1023.42.
102. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2433.
103. Id. Justice Breyer looked to text, structure, and purpose of the statute and
could not find any evidence of Congressional intent to have a broad preemption
provision. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, disagreed with this analysis. Id. at
2440 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy feels that the statute contains a
broad preemption clause because it failed to "repromulgate regulations saving other
state registration fees from preemption." Id.
104. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S.Ct. at 2433.
105. Id. "[W]hile the new regulations implementing the SSRS do not explicitly
exempt unrelated state requirements from the statute's preemptive reach, neither
they nor the rulemaking that produced them suggest any change to pre-existing
practice in this respect." Id.
106. Id. This analysis conforms to the fourth prong of the test laid out in Rice.
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. This aspect the test looks to the federal statute's purpose and
sees if the state regulation falls in the way of achieving that objective. Id.
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,,107 Looking at the statute's purpose and objective is consistent

with the fourth prong of the test set forth in Rice. 10 8 Here, the Court
decided that there is no evidence of any Congressional intent to use
this narrowly worded statute to regulate other state fees or obligations
that do not relate to the SSRS requirements set forth in subsection
(c). °9 Although the Commerce Clause may prevent States from
regulating or imposing fees, Justice Breyer concludes that this
particular federal statute contains no specific provision that prohibits
states from passing
any law that is not related to the SSRS
110
requirements.
2. The Second Legal Question
Having established that the federal statute governs only those
State requirements that deal with the items set forth specifically in
subsection (c), Justice Breyer proceeds to analyze the actual
Michigan fee to see if it falls under the SSRS statute's scope."'
First, the Michigan law does not contain any reference to requiring
evidence of a Federal Permit, insurance, or agent for service of
process. 112 The $100 fee imposed by Michigan on the motor carriers
does not relate to these subject matters. 113 Second, the fee imposed
107. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2434.
108. Id. See also Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
109. Mid-Con Freight Sys. 125 S. Ct. at 2434. The Court gives examples of
what the statute does not regulate. Id. "[A] State Registration requirement related
to compliance by interstate carriers with rules governing the introduction of foreign
pests into the jurisdiction, or with a State's version of the Amber Alert system, or
with size, weight, and safety standards." Id. However, the Court notes that those
types of regulations may or may not be barred by the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution for putting unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. Id. The
Court's point is that this particular federal statute, the SSRS statute, does not
specifically preclude those types of registrations because they are unrelated to the
SSRS requirements. Id.
110. Id. See also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2435. This analysis involves the
Michigan statute imposing a $100 fee on interstate motor carriers with Michigan
license plates. Id. If the statute concerns requirements related to the SSRS, then
the statute is preempted. Id.
112. Id. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 478.2(2) (West 2002).
113. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2435.
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by Michigan is consistent with fees that Michigan has imposed prior
to the SSRS system and even prior to the old "bingo card" system. 114
Consequently, there is no evidence to show that the fee was imposed
as a way to circumvent the SSRS system." 5 Finally, Justice Breyer
points to the fact that Michigan motor carriers can comply with the6
SSRS statute, even if it chooses not to comply with the $100 fee."
In other words, non-compliance with Michigan law does not bar the
7
truck owner from complying with SSRS requirements. "
Justice Breyer, however, noted that there is a connection between
the SSRS and the Michigan fee."1 8 Michigan licensed interstate
trucks need not pay the $10 SSRS fee if the truck has already paid the
$100 Michigan fee and chooses Michigan as its base state. l 9
However, that provision is only put in place as an "administratively
efficient recompense."' 20 That connection alone cannot transform
the Michigan fee that has no relation to SSRS requirements into an

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court lays out the hypothetical as follows:

The owner of that truck can fill out Michigan form RS-1, thereby
providing Michigan with evidence that it has a Federal Permit. It
can also fill out form RS-2, on which it indicates the total SSRS
fees it owes to all participating states whose borders the truck
will cross. Upon submission of the two forms and payment of
the fees, Michigan apparently will give the owner form RS-3, an
SSRS receipt, a copy of which the owner can place in the vehicle
of the truck, thereby complying with Michigan's (and all other
participating
States')
SSRS-related
'State
registration
requirements'. If that owner fails to pay Michigan's $100 fee for
that truck, the owner will not receive a state fee decal. But that
owner will have violated only Michigan's $100 fee statute here at
issue.
Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. The connection is found in Michigan form RS-2. Id. The form
contains a list of all SSRS participating states and their related fees. Id. An
asterisk is placed next to Michigan and provides that Michigan licensed trucks are
exempt from the SSRS fee but need to obtain a Michigan decal by paying a $100

fee. Id.
119. Id. See also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S.Ct. at 2436. The provision is more efficient
because Michigan handles both fees. Id.
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obligation that is prohibited by the SSRS statute. 2 ' Thus, the
Michigan fee is not within the scope of the SSRS statute. 22
The opinion concludes with Justice Breyer's holding that the
SSRS statute does not preempt Michigan's $100 fee, thus affirming
the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals. 123 The decision
comes after the Court examined the statute itself to determine if there
is evidence of federal purpose to preempt state legislation and the
statute's objective to determine if the state law is inconsistent with
the purpose of the federal law. 124 However, there are two other ways
to
to look for evidence of a clear and manifest Congressional intent
125
overlooked.
have
may
preempt state legislation that the Court
First, if there is a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, then
Congress intended to occupy that field of legislation. 126 Here, the
federal regulatory scheme in question is the SSRS statute. 27 The
statute provides a set of regulations designed to regulate interstate
motor carriers registering their Federal Permit. 28 The statute lays
out a specific list of requirements that the motor carrier must provide
in order to comply with the statute.1 29 The specificity of the statute's
requirements indicates the fairly narrow scope of the federal statute.
By clearly delineating what States can and cannot require, Congress

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The court in Rice laid out a four prong test for
preemption. Id. First, is there a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, such that
Congress intended to occupy that field of legislation? Id. Second, is there a
dominant federal regulatory interest in that field, such that a uniform set of federal
regulations is more appropriate? Id. Third, does the federal law evidence any
intent to preempt? Id. And finally, is the state statute inconsistent with the
objectives of the federal law? Id. The third and fourth prongs are addressed in the
court's analysis. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2427-36. However, the first
two prongs have not yet been addressed.
126. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. See also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S.
at 147-48 (holding that a California marketing order that conflicted with federal
rules was not preempted by the federal statute because the federal statute merely
aimed to establish minimum standards, not displace all state regulations).
127. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2428.
128. See 49 U.S.C. § 14504.
129. See 49 U.S.C. § 14504(c).
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did not intend to design a federal regulatory scheme that is so
pervasive that it reaches all types of interstate motor carrier
registration. 130 Rather, the statute's purpose is to regulate the
registration of an interstate motor carrier's possession of a Federal
Permit, proof of insurance, and the name of an agent for service of
process.' 31 Therefore, there is no indication that with this particular
SSRS statute Congress intended to preclude all other State laws
regarding other types of registration not related to the SSRS
requirements. 132
Second, if there is a dominant federal interest in this particular
field, then it is more likely that Congress intended to have a uniform
set of federal regulations.' 33 The field at issue in this case is the
registration of interstate motor carriers. 134 Under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 135 Since
interstate motor carriers are considered instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, the subject is more suitable for uniform federal

130. Id. The statute specifically states: "[T]he State of registration shall fully
comply with standards prescribed under this section." Id. The statute proceeds to
list the specific requirements that the State may impose on interstate truckers. Id.
They include, evidence of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, payment of fees,
and the filing of a name of a local agent for service of process. Id. Furthermore,
the statute establishes specific standards for the fee system that the registration
State must implement. Id.
131. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2434. See also 49 U.S.C. §
14504(c)(2)(A).
132. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2434.
133. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. See also Fla. Lime &Avocado Growers, 373 U.S.
at 143. In that case, the Court contemplated the nature of the avocado industry. Id.
The Court determined that the subject matter was not appropriate for uniform
federal regulations. Id. at 144. In fact, the Court found the subject as one that the
Court had traditionally preferred local regulations.
Id. "Specifically, the
supervision of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a
matter of peculiarly local concern." Id. Therefore, under the second prong of the
preemption test, the California statute in this case was not preempted by the federal
regulation. Id.
134. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2427.
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (holding that
the power to regulate commerce is vested in Congress completely and includes the
regulation of commerce among the several states).
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regulation.' 36 Interstate motor carriers regularly travel across state
lines, so there is a dominant federal interest to maintain a uniform set
of federal regulations.1 37 Having diverse, individual state regulations
would make it harder for interstate trucks to comply with safety
regulations and other obligations imposed by the individual states. 138
Consequently, the regulation of interstate motor carriers is a field that
39
is more appropriate for uniform federal regulations. 1
After examining the federal statute using the four prongs of the
Rice test for Congressional intent, it seems that the federal statute
does not preclude state regulation of interstate motor carrier
registration that does not relate to the SSRS requirements. 140 Even
though the subject of interstate motor carriers is not suitable for state
regulation, the statute's text, basic purpose, and scope indicates that
Congress only intended to preclude state regulation that relates to the
possession of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and the name of
an agent for service of process. 141

136. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. The Court said, "[t]he power of Congress
... comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as
that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce... among the
several States." Id. The Gibbons case involved boats operating in interstate
commerce, but the principle can also be applied to trucks that operate in interstate
commerce. Id. The Court clearly indicated that all types of interstate navigation, no
matter the nature, are within Congress' power. Id.
137. Id. See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99 (2000). In that case,
the Court articulated:
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where
the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our
Republic and is now well established. The authority of Congress
to regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from
intervention of the separate States and resulting difficulties with
foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the
reasons for adopting the Constitution.
Id.
138. Locke, 529 U.S. at 99.
139. Id.
140. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
141. See supra notes 49-130 and accompanying text.
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B. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
142
Justice Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion for this case.
He began by stating his disagreement with the Michigan Court of
Appeals.1 43 The Michigan Court of Appeals created a rule in which a
fee is considered regulatory, and not a registration fee, if the purpose
of the fee is to regulate an industry or service. 144 Applying that rule,
the Michigan $100 fee in question would be a regulatory fee, and not
a registration fee, because the purpose was to enforce the Michigan
Motor Carrier Act, which covers the costs of enforcing safety
regulations. 145 Justice Kennedy emphasized that this rule is faulty
because it would permit states to impose any fee by simply stating a
regulatory purpose or using a portion of the fees collected to enforce
some regulation. 146 The rule is too broad and would create
147
undesirable results for future cases.
Justice Kennedy then proceeded to explain his disagreement with
the majority opinion. 148 First, Justice Kennedy critiqued the Court's
textual interpretation of the SSRS statute. 149 The first sentence of §
14504(b) is a provision that preempts state registration requirements0
on interstate motor carriers that are not authorized under the SSRS.15
In other words, state registration requirements that are "completed

142. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2437 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy is joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor in his dissent.
Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. See also Westlake Transp., 662 N.W.2d 784, 794-96 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003).
145. Mid-Con Freight Sys., 125 S. Ct. at 2438 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Id. Justice Kennedy also points out that the Court of Appeal's approach
would exclude state requirement that involve the same subject matter as the SSRS
because the purpose of the SSRS is to regulate interstate trucking and the fees
collected were for administering that purpose. Id.
147. Id. "[T]he Michigan Court of Appeals' broad rule ...[would] work
additional mischief in future cases, a most undesirable result in this area, where
fees and regulatory requirements are so pervasive." Id.
148. Id. at 2438-39.
149. Id. Justice Kennedy disagrees with the Court's narrow interpretation of §
14504 because it departs from the statute's text. Id. According to Justice Kennedy,
the statute's plain text clearly indicates that the Michigan fee is preempted. Id.
150. Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
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under standards of the Secretary" are not preempted by the SSRS. 15 1
However, the Court added to that provision by ruling that state
registration requirements that are unrelated to the requirements
specified in subsection (c) are also saved from preemption.152 Justice
Kennedy does not see any basis in the text of the statute that supports
53
this addition.1
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court's argument that,
because the first sentence of the section refers only to the
requirements set out in subsection (c), the second sentence must also
be referring to the same requirements, is faulty. 154 The first sentence
contains two terms that Justice Kennedy believes should be
interpreted a certain way, "requirements of a State that [an interstate
motor carrier] must register" and "registration requirement." 155
These terms are only general references to any state requirements that
interstate motor carriers register with the State. 156 This meaning is
also applicable to the term, "State registration requirement," found in
the second sentence.1 57 However, when read in context, the first
sentence protects state registration requirements that are "completed
under the standards of the Secretary.' 58 The second sentence is a
preemption provision against all other state registration requirements
59
of interstate motor carriers.

151. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
152. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2439.
Title 49 U.S.C. § 14054(b), by its terms, saves from preemption
only one class of state registration requirements imposed on
interstate motor carriers: those completed under standards of the
Secretary under §14504(c), i.e., those that are authorized under
the SSRS. To this subset the Court adds a second class of state
registration requirements saved from preemption: those that
concern subject matters not covered under §14504(c).
Id.
153. Id. at 2440.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also 49 U.S.C. § 14504(b).
156. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S.Ct. at 2439.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2440.
159. Id. The Court's statement that the statute contains no language that
suggests "State registration requirement" refers to any type of registration
requirement for interstate motor carriers is irrelevant because the statute clearly
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Justice Kennedy then addresses the Court's use of statutory
history to supports its argument. 160 The majority opinion reasoned
that since pre-SSRS federal laws contained narrow preemption
16
provisions, the SSRS statute has the same preemptive effect.
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, believes that Congress did intend
62
to expand the preemptive scope when it passed the new scheme.
The statute does contain a broader preemption provision because the
statue does not have the same preemptive provisions as the older
statute.' 63 The failure to put in the same, or similar, provisions is
evidence of Congressional intent to expand the preemptive scope of
64
the new statute.'
Justice Kennedy proceedes to critique the Court's final reason for
1 65
interpreting the SSRS statute narrowly, the statute's basic purpose.
Justice Breyer found that the SSRS statute was put in place for the
1 66
basic purpose of replacing an older, more burdensome, system.
Therefore,

the

main

concern

of the

SSRS

was

increasing

indicates its preemptive scope. Id. at 2439-40. Thus, there is no need to look for
confirmation in the statute's history or other provision. Id. at 2440.
160. Id.
161. Id. Justice Kennedy concedes that the Court is correct to say that the old
"bingo-card" statute did not preempt state fees that do not relate to Federal Permits
or insurance. Id. at 2440-41.
However, Justice Kennedy does not see the
relevance of this observation. Id. In his opinion, the preemptive scope of the
statute that preceded § 14504 says little about the preemption effect of the current
statute. Id. Instead, Justice Kennedy feels that the lack of new provisions in the
statute indicates that the federal agency intended to expand the preemptive scope.
Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. "[T]he failure to repromulgate regulations saving other state
registration fees from preemption suggests that the federal agency charged with
implementing the SSRS did think that § 14504(b) expanded the scope of federal
preemption." Id.
164. Id. at 2441. Justice Kennedy disagrees with the majority's use of
historical comparison with preceding statutes because, according to him,
comparison with prior statutes is only permissible when the current statute is
ambiguous. Id. Here, the text of the statute is clear, thus there is no need to look at
the previous scheme and create additional ambiguity. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Justice Kennedy points out that the Court "makes no convincing
argument that § 14504(b)'s purpose was so limited." Id.
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efficiency.' 67 According to Justice Kennedy, the Court failed to
establish why the statute's purpose requires the Court to read the
statute so narrowly.' 68 The only reason provided by Justice Breyer
was that the statute contains no indication that Congress intended for
the SSRS statute to have a broader preemptive effect.' 69 However, as
Justice Kennedy discussed earlier, there is an indication that
Congress did intend to do so.1 7' The lack of legislative history is not
a valid reason
for narrowly interpreting an otherwise clear and broad
71
statute.
In Justice Kennedy's view, the majority's reading of the term
"State registration requirement" was not correct because the phrase
was limited to state registration requirements that relate to the SSRS
requirements. 172 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, found that the
phrase is better read to mean state registration requirements that are
imposed solely for the fact that an entity is an interstate motor
carrier.1 73 Under this view, § 14504(b) would only preempt state
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The majority and dissenting opinions of this case seem to have
differing views on the meaning attached to the absence of statements in legislative
history indicating an expansion or limitation of the preemptive scope of this statute.
Id. For the majority, a lack of legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to maintain the same preemptive scope as the preceding statute. Id. For the
dissent, however, the absence of any statements in the legislative history indicates
that the federal agency intended to broaden the scope of the preemptive provision.
Id. at 2440.
170. Id.
171. Id. The dissent cites several cases to support this argument. Id. "[I]t
would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to
state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on
the face of a statute." Id. at 2441 (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus, Inc., 446 U.S.
578, 592 (1980)).
172. Id at 2442. Justice Kennedy does note that the phrase is ambiguous
because it could be interpreted as being an exemption for interstate motor carriers
from any requirements that apply to all motor carriers. Id. Or, it could mean that
only non-SSRS registration requirements that are imposed specifically on interstate
motor carriers are preempted. Id. Justice Breyer, on the other hand, feels that the
dissent undertakes "interpretive acrobatics" to come to its conclusion. Id. at 2433.
Justice Breyer feels that the structure and language of the statute requires no such
interpretation. Id.
173. Id. "[T]he more natural and sensible reading of the phrase 'requirement
of a State that a motor carrier providing [interstate transportation] must register
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registration requirements that single out interstate motor carriers.174
Justice Kennedy feels that the question of whether or not the
Michigan law in question is preempted by the SSRS statute is a
question more suitable for remand.'75
Finally, Justice Kennedy addresses Justice Breyer's critique that
Justice Kennedy's reading of the statute would allow states to
implement regulations in excess of the SSRS standards, as long as
interstate motor carriers are not singled out. 17 6 The majority fails to
take into consideration the restraints provided in the SSRS statute.' 77
Justice Kennedy believes that the correct reading of the statute should
lead to a scheme that is rational. 17 8 First, states, regardless of their
participation in the SSRS, may not impose registration requirements
that single out interstate motor carriers, unless the requirements
comply with the SSRS statute. 179 Second, states that are participating
in the SSRS may impose registration requirements that are general
and neutral but incidentally affect interstate motor carriers unless the
requirements violate the specific limitations provided by the SSRS. 18 °
Finally, states that are not participating in the SSRS can impose any
registration requirements that are general and neutral, even if they
8
relate to the specific SSRS requirements.' '
According to Justice Kennedy, the majority's interpretation
would lead to doubtful results.' 82 For example, states would be
allowed to impose any registration requirements, however irrational,
with the State,' includes only those registration requirements that are triggered
specifically by the fact that the entity in question is an interstate motor carrier." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The dissent concedes that the majority correctly noted that under
Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the statute, general and neutral state
requirements would not be preempted by the federal statute, even if they involved
requirements similar to the SSRS. Id. However, the dissent is quick to emphasize
that this would not mean that a State may impose outrageous obligations for proof
of insurance, as long as the obligation applies to all motor carriers. Id. at 2442.
177. Id. at 2443. See also § 14504(c)(2)(B) for the statute's constraints on the
base State's ability to require registration and fees for interstate motor carriers.
178. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S.Ct. at 2443.
179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. Id.
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as long as the subject matter does not relate to the SSRS
requirements. 83 Or, states that are not a part of the SSRS scheme,
would not be allowed to impose any obligations on interstate motor
carriers, if the registration requirement relates to evidence of 84a
Federal Permit, proof of insurance, or agent for service of process.'
Justice Kennedy feels that the Court relied on "flawed textual
analysis and dubious inferences from legislative silences to impose
the Court's view of what it thinks Congress probably wanted to
say." 85 The dissent would recommend sending the case back to the
lower courts for a remand to evaluate other arguments that were not
considered by the Michigan Court of1 86Appeals or this Court which
might decide the outcome of this case.
V. IMPACT

The Court's decision in Mid-Con Freight Systems v. Michigan
Public Service Commission187 will affect many future cases,
especially in the field of preemption. This decision is one of the most
recent in a long history of the Supreme Court's struggle to find the
perfect balance between upholding federal statutes as the supreme
law of the land and allowing states to exercise their own police
powers. 88 Furthermore, the subject of interstate commerce has
183. Id.
184. Id. Justice Kennedy sums up his critique of the Court's interpretation:
Under the Court's interpretation, the statute does not pre-empt
state regulations that single out interstate carriers for special
burdens well beyond what the SSRS allows, but it does prevent
non-SSRS States from applying a number of modest, evenhanded
registration requirements to interstate carriers, even though the
SSRS is not available to these States.
Id. at 2443-44.
185. Id. at 2444.
186. Id.
187. Mid-Con Freight Sys. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427
(2005).
188. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption,
53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002). In this law review article, Davis discusses the long and
puzzling history of the Supreme Court's preemption cases over the last one
hundred years. Id. at 968-69. Davis argues that the Court has long favored a
presumption in favor of preemption, even though the Court has stated otherwise.
Id. at 968. Historically, preemption cases have involved a variety of subject
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always been a hotly litigated issue, and this case sheds more light on
Congress' power over the matter.
A. GeneralLegal Impact
The most significant legal impact of the Mid-Con Freight
decision is that states are not precluded from passing regulations on
interstate motor carriers, as long as the regulation does not relate to
SSRS requirements.1 89 In other words, the federal SSRS statute only
preempts state regulations regarding the registration of a Federal
Permit, proof of insurance, and name of a local agent for service of
process. 190 Other state registration requirements that have nothing to
do with those three subjects are not considered an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. 91 For example, states may be able
to impose a fee for trucks that are a certain size or weight because the
subject of size and weight are not specifically enumerated in the
SSRS statute. 192
Another significant impact is on the subject of preemption. In his
opinion, Justice Breyer closely scrutinized the SSRS statute's text
9 3
and language to find Congress' intent to preclude state legislation.'
This is a good indication that the Court places a heavy weight on the
face and plain meaning of federal statutes when looking for a clear
94
and manifest Congressional intent to preclude state legislation.

matters, from state tort liability actions to cigarette labeling to railroad crossings.
Id. at 968-69. Davis notes that the Supreme Court will continue to decide more
preemption cases in the future in an effort to further clarify the doctrine. Id. at 969.
189. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2430.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2430-31.
192. Id. at 2443-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2432.
194. Id. See also Davis, supra note 188, at 971. Here, Davis discusses the
evolution of the Court's preemption doctrine from a strong presumption of
preemption, to a reliance on express preemption provisions, and finally to a focus
on the concept of implied obstacle preemption. See also Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. at 881 (holding that federal statutes impliedly preempt state
laws that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives). This
article was written in 2002, and with the Mid-Con Freight decision this year, it
seems that the Court has gone more towards a reasoning based on the plain
meaning and basic purpose of the federal statute.
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Justice Breyer also focused on the basic purpose of the federal statute
to see if the state law hinders the federal objective. 95 Therefore, the
decision shows us that the Court favors the third and fourth prong of
the Rice' 96 test for preemption. 197 As a consequence, Congress must
now place a greater importance on making its intent clear in the laws
that it passes. 98 In order for the laws to be interpreted correctly by
the Court, the intent of Congress must be clear and manifest in the
language, text, and purpose of the federal statute they are writing.
Consequently, courts will now be responsible for interpreting the
federal statute's text and analyzing its basic purpose when faced with
a preemption case. This approach departs from prior cases, where
the courts were often asked to speculate on Congressional intent by
looking at implied obstacles. Justice Breyer's focus on language and
purpose should lead to a clearer preemption doctrine.
B. Impact on Administrative Law: State regulationson interstate
trucking
On the administrative law aspect of the decision, Mid-Con
Freight 99 has more clearly defined the roles of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the state level agencies that regulate the
trucking industry. The federal administrative agency, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, is authorized by the SSRS statute to require
195. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2434.
196. Rice, 331 U.S. at 218.
197. Id. at 230. The Rice case stands for the proposition that federal law does
not preempt state law, unless there is clear and manifest Congressional intent
indicating otherwise. Id. There are four ways to find a clear and manifest
Congressional intent: (1) the federal regulation is so pervasive that Congress left no
room for states to regulate, (2) there is a dominant federal interest in the field at
issue, (3) the law evidences federal intent to preempt, and finally (4) the state
regulation is inconsistent with the federal law's objective. Id.
198. See Davis, supra note 188, at 971. Davis, in her 2002 law review article,
also calls for more Congressional clarity. "Many have called for Congress to speak
its intent to preempt clearly; I join that chorus but with no anticipation that the song
will be heard." Id. Her article goes on to argue that legislative clarity is important
so that there is no need for the Court to undertake such extensive interpretations of
federal statutes. Id. "In our federalist system, the Supreme Court should not be
permitted to continue to affect the traditional operation of state law in the stealth
manner that it has..." Id. at 972.
199. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005).

666

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

26-2

truckers to register their Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and name
for a local agent for service of process.2 °° The Court's decision in
Mid-Con Freight limited the scope of that authority to those three
enumerated subjects, thus allowing local state agencies to pass
regulations that are unrelated to the SSRS
statute without being
20 1
commerce.
interstate
on
deemed a burden
This expansion of the State agency's power to regulate interstate
trucks is a significant impact on the trucking industry. As a
consequence of Mid-Con Freight's holding, states may follow
Michigan's lead and impose $100 fees or more on trucks licensed in
their respective states by citing reasons unrelated to the SSRS. This
result would be in direct opposition to the basic purpose of the SSRS
statute. 22002 Moreover, the ICC is now limited in its regulatory powers
over the interstate trucking industry, defeating the original purpose
for which it was formed.20 3 Instead of having one entity uniformly
regulating interstate trucks, we are now allowing individual states to
pass their own regulations.
C. Impact on Society
1. Burdens on the trucking industry
Interstate commerce has always been a vital component of this
nation's economy. As an instrumentality of interstate commerce,
motor carriers play an important role in the country's commercial
industries, transporting goods and services among states and
commercial ports. 2 4 Thus, legislative and judicial decisions that

200. 49 U.S.C. § 14504(a) (Supp. 2006).
201. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2443 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. 49 U.S.C. § 14504. See also Alex N. Vogel, Keep on Truckin': Rejection
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's Interpretationof the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1423 (1996). "Under the
new single-state system, carriers were only required to register with one
state... [t]his single act of registration served to 'satisfy the registration
requirements of all other States'." Id. at 1425.
203. See also Vogel, supra note 196, at 1425. "Congress gave the ICC the task
of designing and implementing a 'single-state' registration system." Id.
204. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation:A Legal History, 30 TRANSP.
L.J. 235 (2003).
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impact the trucking industry will also have a significant effect on the
economy as a whole.
Allowing states to regulate interstate motor carriers, as long as
the regulations are not related to SSRS requirements, could lead to a
variety of onerous state level obligations imposed on interstate
truckers. 215 Consequently, this decision will impact the operation of
the interstate trucking business. By ruling that the SSRS statute only
precludes state regulations regarding proof of Federal Permit, proof
of insurance, and name of an agent for service of process, the Court
has opened the door for state agencies to pass legislation regarding
everything else. 20 6 As noted above, states may now be able to
regulate the size of trucks, by requiring trucks of a certain size to
register with the state or imposing fees related to truck size. 20 7 As a
result, interstate motor carriers now carry the burden of complying
with individual state registration requirements, in addition to the
federal SSRS requirements. Tending to the burden of complying
with both state and federal requirements may lead to higher
administrative expenses, longer transport times, and ultimately,
higher costs for the transported goods.
Historically, having a uniform system of regulation through the
federal agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, has served the
trucking industry well.20 8 Primary concerns, such as safety and rates,
Transportation is also a fundamental component of economic
growth. It is the infrastructure foundation upon which the rest of
the economy is built. Any region, which loses access to the
system, and thereby the means to participate in the broader
market for the exchange of goods and services, will wither on the
vine. Throughout history, it has been the recognition of the role
transportation plays in social and economic development that has
inspired a strong governmental presence in its promotion,
facilitation, and regulation.
Id. at 239-40.
205. See Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. at 2443 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. Id. "According to the Court, that statute permits States to impose on
interstate carriers any number of onerous requirements so long as these
requirements are not explicitly linked to the subjects covered by the SSRS." Id.
207. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
208. See Dempsey, supra note 198, at 358.
Under economic regulation [of the ICC], the industry grew and
prospered. Motor carriers became responsible, reliable and safe
enterprises. Competition became healthy with modest
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were handled through one entity instead of individual states. If
today's decision starts a movement away from this centralized
20 9
system, problems may arise in the nation's trucking industry.
2. Burdens on the general public
If states do in fact impose additional registration requirements on
interstate motor carriers, there will be a significant impact on the
price of goods for the general public. For example, continuing with
the hypothetical state registration requirement based on truck size
mentioned above, a motor carrier that transports oversized goods in
large trucks will have to spend more money than before because they
will be obligated to register their truck with the state and pay an
additional fee. 210 In other words, instead of having to comply with
only the federal registration requirements, states may impose
additional fees or requirements on interstate motor carriers before
they may engage in interstate travel.
This results in higher
transportation costs which would ultimately lead to higher prices for
the goods being transported. 21' The higher price directly impacts the
retail price for consumers purchasing the goods.
government oversight of rate levels and entry. Efficient and wellmanaged carriers earned a reasonable return on investment. The
stability of the motor carrier industry provided a foundation for
national economic recovery.
Id. at 287-88.
209. See Dempsey, supra note 198, at 358. Dempsey argues that deregulation
of the transportation industry, and the ICC's declining authority led to a variety of
problems.
The first two decades of deregulation were the darkest financial
period of the airline, bus and trucking industries. They produced
an unprecedented failure rate. More than 150 airlines went
bankrupt. More than 1,000 motor carriers ceased operations
every year beginning in 1983. More than half the general freight
trucking companies disappeared.
Id.
210. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
211. See Dempsey, supra note 198, at 360-361.
Whatever the truth on whether deregulation has benefited
consumers, its impact on the industry itself was profound ...
Alfred Kahn admitted, "There is no denying that the profit record
of the industry since 1978 has been dismal, that deregulation
bears substantial responsibility, and that the proponents of
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VI. CONCLUSION

The impact of the Mid-Con Freight Systems 2 12 decision will be
felt far beyond the state lines of Michigan. The decision affects how
thousands of trucking companies will conduct their interstate
transport business, how much money the general public will spend on
goods, and how states will pass legislation. The majority and
dissenting opinions raised important, competing, issues and made
strong arguments that could have swung the conclusion either way.
In the end, the majority chose to go down a path that leads to
preemption analysis that relies heavily on the plain meaning of the
federal statute, and its basic objectives.2" 3 Furthermore, Justice
Breyer's holding clearly stands for the proposition that the federal
statute, 49 U.S.C. § 14054, does not preclude state requirements that
are unrelated to evidence of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, or
name of a local agent for service of process. 21 4 Only time will tell
whether this decision will open a floodgate for increased state
regulations of interstate trucks, or if the effect will be limited to the
Michigan statute at issue in this case. Either way, the Court's
decision in Mid-Con Freight215 has shed more light on the law of
federal preemption and the regulation of interstate trucking.

deregulation did not anticipate such financial distress - either so
intense or so long-continued."

Id.
212. Mid-Con FreightSys., 125 S. Ct. 2427 (2005).
213. Id. at 2432-36.
214. Id.
215. Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S.Ct. 2427
(2005).

